I. Introduction
Since Samuelson's clear statement of the theory of consumption externalities (public goods) [7] , there has been substantial progress in sharpening analytical tools for tax and expenditure problems. An important part of this progress has been the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Lindahl's [6] quasi-demand solution to the taxation problem by Johansen [4] and Samuelson [8] .
More recently the theory of the core of an n-person game has been applied elegantly to the problem of economic general equilibrium [9] . The purpose of this paper is to state rigorously the nodern theory of resource allocation with public goods, and to study the relationship between Lindahl's solution and the core.
Section II introduces assumptions and definitions, including the notion of "public competitive equilibrium 71 of [3] .
Section III establishes the relation between marginal rates of transformation and marginal rates of substitution at Pareto optimal allocations of the economy. This is a reconstruction of Samuelson's first paper [7] .
Section IV defines and establishes the existence of Lindahl equilibrium.
Section V defines the core.
Section VI consists of a proof that a
Lindahl equilibrium is in the core. See Foley [3] for a discussion of this definition and a proof that -4-a public competitive equilibrium is a Pareto optimum.
III. Prices
The prices of public goods in a public competitive equilibrium are marginal rates of transformation. Samuelson [7] has shown that at a Pareto optimum the marginal rates of transformation for public goods are equal to the sums of marginal rates of substitution. This is the essence of the following theorem.
There is a separate public good price vector for each individual.
Every individual facing his separate price vector "demands" the same vector of public goods as every other. As Johnson [4] explicated clearly, it was Lindahl's idea [6] to find a kind of mock competitive equilibrium in the public sector. On the assumption that the endowments of the society have already been redistributed to achieve an ethical optimum, this competitive equilibrium will also be the social welfare optimum.
Competitive equilibrium requires that all consumers be maximizing satisfaction at the income they get from their own endowment. In other words all the lump-sum transfers must be zero. In the language of the "benefit theory," the value of public goods received by each individual is equal to the total tax he pays. To prove the existence of a Lindahl equilibrium the following lemma, adapted trivially from Debreu [2] is necessary. An argument similar to the one based on monotonicity used in section II will assure that p > and n > 0. 
